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Abstract
The UK government is planning to introduce stakeholder pensions from April 2001 as an
alternative to existing personal pensions for people on moderate earnings. But stakeholder pensions
are only one way to save for retirement; the new tax-free Individual Savings Account (ISA) is
another. This note compares the tax treatments of pensions and ISAs and assesses the conditions
under which the tax treatment of private pensions is more generous than that of an ISA to a basic-
rate taxpayer — the typical target for stakeholder pensions. The abolition of dividend tax credits
paid to pension funds in July 1997 reduced the relatively tax-favoured position of pensions, but the
tax-free lump sum means that private pensions continue to be a tax-favoured form of saving at most




The government’s recently published Green Paper, Partnership in Pensions,
contained proposals for reform to the UK pension system.
1 These include the
introduction of stakeholder pensions from April 2001, which the government
hopes will offer a ‘low cost, flexible and secure’ alternative to existing personal
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pensions.
2 Making stakeholder pensions cheaper and more flexible than existing
personal pensions will increase the attraction of pension saving. However,
stakeholder pensions are only one possible vehicle in which individuals can save
for their retirement. The new tax-free Individual Savings Account (ISA) is
another. Compared with stakeholder pensions, ISAs have the attraction of not
tying up savings until retirement. This is likely to be important for people in the
target group for stakeholder pensions — those earning between £9,000 and
£18,500 who do not currently have a private pension. Disney, Emmerson and
Tanner (1999) show that members of this group are likely to have interrupted
employment, fluctuating earnings and little or no other savings and may prefer to
place future savings in a liquid form.
However, the impact of the differential tax treatment of savings held in a
private pension compared with an ISA could be an important influence on saving
decisions. The abolition of dividend tax credits paid to pension funds in July
1997 reduced the tax advantage given to pensions, since a 10 per cent dividend
tax credit is paid to people holding shares in an ISA, at least for the first five
years. But saving in a pension continues to benefit from individuals being able to
take up to one-quarter of the value of the fund as a tax-free lump sum on
retirement. This note compares the tax treatments of private pensions and of
ISAs and assesses the conditions under which the tax treatment of private
pensions is more generous than that of an ISA to a basic-rate taxpayer — the
typical target for stakeholder pensions. We show that private pensions continue
to be a relatively tax-favoured form of saving, particularly when contributions
are made by employers since these are not subject to income tax or National
Insurance contributions.
II. THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSIONS AND ISAs
There are three possible points for taxing saving — the initial payments, the
returns received on the investment (income and capital gain) and withdrawal. In
the case of individuals’ contributions out of earned income into a private
pension, full tax relief is given at the marginal income tax rate.
3 However,
employers will have paid National Insurance (NI) on the gross earnings out of
which individuals’ contributions are made and the individuals will also have paid
employee NI, albeit at the reduced, contracted-out rate. When employers make
contributions, however, as is the case in occupational pension schemes, these are
not subject to employee or employer NI.
4 No tax is incurred on returns accruing
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within a pension fund and, before July 1997, dividend tax credits were payable at
a rate of 20 per cent on shares held in a private pension. In retirement,
individuals are required to use the accumulated fund to purchase an annuity —
with the exception of one-quarter of the fund, which can be taken as a tax-free
lump sum — and pay income tax on annuity income (see Table 1).
5
In July 1997, the payment of 20 per cent dividend tax credits to pension funds
was abolished. Every £1 of dividend income was worth £1.25 before July 1997
but only £1 after the change.
6 This reduced the tax-favoured position of pensions
compared with their treatment prior to July 1997. But an important issue for
saving decisions is whether pensions are now given more or less favourable tax
treatment than other forms of saving. The tax-free lump sum is important in this
respect, as are opportunities for tax arbitrage — that is, the possibility for
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TABLE 1
The Taxation of Private Pensions and ISAs














Not liable to income
tax, employer NI or
employee NI




Returns (capital gains) Exempt Exempt Exempt






Note: The exempt status of returns to ISAs has been guaranteed by the government for at least 10 years. The 10
per cent dividend tax credit is set to expire in April 2004 but could be extended in a future Finance Bill.Fiscal Studies
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individuals to reduce their overall tax burden by getting relief on contributions at
a higher rate than that at which tax is paid on withdrawal. The opportunity for
tax arbitrage makes pensions particularly attractive to higher-rate taxpayers. The
tax-free personal allowance and the 10 per cent tax-rate band might provide an
opportunity for tax arbitrage by basic-rate taxpayers, but in practice most people
will receive income from the basic state pension and the State Earnings-Related
Pension Scheme (SERPS) or the State Second Pension at least equal to the value
of the tax-free personal allowance and the 10p band. This will also be true for
people who ‘opt out’ of the State Second Pension since the contracted-out
rebates are intended to be designed in such a way that individuals are no worse
off than if they were in the state scheme.
7
Finally, the fact that employer pension contributions are not subject to
employer and employee NI (and that no NI is payable on withdrawal) makes
these an extremely tax-effective way of saving, as we show later. Employer
contributions could become more important with the introduction of stakeholder
pensions. Since the government is going to compel employers to designate a
provider and allow employees to make contributions directly from their pay-
packet (Department of Social Security, 1999b), the fixed costs associated with
employer contributions will have already been met and this could lead to an
increase in employer contributions.
Individual Savings Accounts replaced Tax-Exempt Special Savings Accounts
(TESSAs) and Personal Equity Plans (PEPs) from April 1999. They provide a
single tax-free savings vehicle for holdings of cash, life insurance and stocks and
shares. They are subject to an overall annual investment limit of £5,000 (£7,000
in 1999–2000), with separate limits of £1,000 on the amount that can be held as
life insurance and of £1,000 (£3,000 in the first year) on the amount that can be
held in cash. Individuals pay into ISAs out of income that is net of tax and NI
contributions, but the returns on assets held in an ISA are tax-free and no tax is
due when funds are withdrawn from an ISA. Equity investments in ISAs are
exempt from capital gains tax, and a 10 per cent tax credit will be paid on all
dividends from UK equities. This is less generous than the 20 per cent dividend
tax credit that was paid to holders of PEPs prior to April 1999. For every £1 of
dividend income paid, an ISA-holder will get £1.11 compared with £1.25
previously received by a PEP-holder. The government has promised that the
returns to ISAs are guaranteed tax-free for at least 10 years, while the 10 per cent
dividend tax credit will stay at least until April 2004.
8
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III. COMPARING THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSIONS AND ISAs
Which is more favourably taxed, a private pension or an ISA? For basic-rate
taxpayers, the answer depends on whether the value of the tax relief on the lump
sum in the case of a private pension is worth more than the value of the dividend
tax credit in the case of an ISA. In turn, this depends on the annual rate of return.
The greater the annual rate of return, the greater the value of the dividend tax
credit, assuming a constant dividend pay-out ratio.
9 We use simple examples to
compare the overall return to investing in a private pension and a tax-free
savings scheme at different annual rates of return.
Our examples are based on an individual who earns £15,000 a year — that is,
someone in the stakeholder target earnings band — who invests 10 per cent of
their net earnings for 30 years in either a private pension or a tax-free savings
scheme. We assume that the marginal income tax rate is 23 per cent, as is
currently the case for basic-rate taxpayers in the UK. In addition, earnings are
subject to employer and employee NI contributions at the 1999–2000 rates of 9.2
and 8.4 per cent respectively. In effect, by assuming that the same rate of NI is
paid in both cases, we are assuming that the individual has already decided to opt
out of the state scheme and is choosing where to invest their marginal pound of
contributions. We do not consider the option of staying in the state scheme
(paying higher NI contributions) and investing in an ISA. We assume that tax
relief is given on money invested in a pension at the marginal rate of income tax
and that one-quarter of the total value of the pension fund is taken as a tax-free
lump sum at the end of 30 years. The impact of tax arbitrage for basic-rate
taxpayers is ignored since it is assumed that the combined value of the basic
state pension and the pension income from investing the contracted-out rebate
uses up the individual’s personal allowance and 10p band.
The rate of return (expressed in real terms) is assumed to be the same for a
private pension as for an ISA. It is possible that, perhaps due to having funds that
are locked away for longer periods of time, pension providers are able to deliver
higher rates of return than ISAs. In fact, the median annualised real return over
the last five years for PEPs investing in UK companies was 10 per cent — the
same as for pension funds investing in UK equities.
10 We assume a 50 per cent
dividend pay-out ratio and show the sensitivity of our results to this assumption
later on. We also assume that both ISAs and pensions are subject to a charge of 1
per cent of the annual value of the fund. This is the rate that currently applies to
                                                                                                                                   
9Higher levels of return might be correlated with lower dividend pay-out ratios if it is believed that riskier
investments are less likely to pay dividends, whereas lower-risk assets such as indexed gilts typically pay a
fixed real income and only experience small price fluctuations.
10Source: Moneywise website, 1 August 1999.Fiscal Studies
70
CAT-standard ISAs and the rate that has been proposed for stakeholder
pensions.
11
Table 2 shows the total net value of the fund in a pension or ISA after 30
years at different annual rates of investment return. The total amount that the
individual invests out of net income over 30 years is £30,870.
12 The difference
between this and the net fund value in the different schemes is determined by the
annual investment return and the tax system. The final column of Table 2 shows
the net value of the fund saved in a tax-free savings account with no dividend tax
credit. We use this bench-mark to illustrate the impact of differences in
investment returns on the overall return after 30 years. Differences from this
reflect the impact of the tax system. Table 3 expresses the fund value of a private
pension and an ISA with a dividend tax credit relative to this bench-mark case.
The net value of the pension fund is 10.49 per cent higher than the bench-
mark case of a tax-free savings scheme with no dividend tax credit. The effect of
the tax-free lump sum is to increase the net value of the pension fund by 7.47 per
cent.
13 The higher 10.49 per cent figure arises from the fact that, in the case of a
pension, only income tax, not NI, is deferred. This means that individuals are
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with CAT-marked ISAs.
12i.e. 30 × 0.1 × 15000 × (1–0.23–0.084).
13i.e. (0.25+0.75{1–0.23})/(1–0.23).
TABLE 2
Net Fund Value after 30 Years




credit for 30 years
10% dividend tax





1% £34,057 £31,072 £30,830 £30,822
5% £65,736 £62,301 £59,610 £59,492
10% £165,656 £166,058 £150,784 £149,923
15% £448,404 £476,732 £410,282 £405,817
Rate of return at
which savings
scheme > pension
— 9.8% 93.6% —
Note: These examples are based on an individual earning £15,000 a year who invests 10 per cent of their net
earnings for 30 years. The marginal tax rate is 23 per cent and the rate of employee NI contributions is 8.4 per
cent.Tax Treatment of Private Pensions and ISAs
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only liable to income tax on contributions (and returns) net of NI, not on the full
amount of their gross earnings as they would be in a tax-free savings scheme.
This increases the final net value of investing the same amount in a pension
rather than in a tax-free savings scheme. Note that the 10.49 per cent figure is the
same, irrespective of the annual investment return. Whether, at the end of 30
years, the individual is better off having invested in a pension or a tax-free
savings scheme depends on the annual investment return. The higher the
investment return, the greater the value of the dividend tax credit (assuming a
constant dividend pay-out ratio) and the more likely it is that investing in a
savings scheme will yield a larger fund than investing in a pension.
14 If the
annual real investment return is less than 9.8 per cent, the net value of the
pension fund after 30 years is greater than the value of the same amount invested
in a savings scheme. If the annual rate of return is higher than this, the total value
of the fund invested in a savings scheme is greater.
15
The results in Tables 2 and 3 are based on a 50 per cent dividend pay-out
ratio. Table 4 illustrates the sensitivity of our results to this assumption. It shows
the dividend pay-out ratios required for the tax treatment of an ISA with a 30-
year tax credit to be as generous as that of employee contributions to a private
pension at different annual rates of return. For example, if the real rate of return
is 10 per cent, then at least 48.9 per cent of the return must be paid as dividends
for the fund in an ISA to be worth as much as a pension fund after 30 years. If
dividend pay-out ratios fall, then this increases further the generosity of the tax
treatment of private pensions relative to that of an ISA.
                                                                                                                                   
14All our examples are expressed in real terms. However, higher inflation will also make the dividend tax credit
more valuable since it is paid as a percentage of nominal dividend income.
15It should be pointed out that if the values of the fund invested in a savings scheme and in a pension were the
same, the greater liquidity of funds in savings schemes would tend to make them more attractive.
TABLE 3
The Impact of Tax on the Overall Return






credit for 30 years
10% dividend tax
credit for 5 years
No dividend tax
credit
1% 10.49% 0.81% 0.03% 0%
5% 10.49% 4.72% 0.20% 0%
10% 10.49% 10.76% 0.57% 0%
15% 10.49% 17.47% 1.10% 0%
Note: These percentages express the additional net fund value in alternative savings vehicles compared with
investing in a tax-free savings scheme where no dividend tax credit is paid.Fiscal Studies
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TABLE 4
Required Dividend Pay-Out Ratios








aThis is the dividend pay-out ratio required to make the
tax treatment of an ISA at least as generous as the tax
treatment of a pension, given the annual investment return.
An annual real rate of return of 9.8 per cent may not seem unreasonable,
given a median annualised real return to PEPs and pensions of 10 per cent over
the last five years. Also, the greater liquidity of an ISA may be enough to
compensate people for a slightly lower investment return. However, these
comparisons have assumed that dividend tax credit is paid for the full 30 years in
the tax-free savings scheme. In fact, the government has only guaranteed the
dividend tax credit for five years, although it is quite possible for it to be
extended beyond this date. If the dividend tax credit is only paid for five years,
the real rate of return at which the value of the dividend tax credit is greater than
the tax relief on the lump sum increases substantially to an implausible 93.6 per
cent.
Finally, consider the case of pension contributions made by the employer.
Individual contributions are made out of income that is exempt from income tax
but will have been subject to employee NI at the rate of 8.4 per cent. The
employer must also pay NI on the individual’s gross income at a rate of 9.2 per
cent.
16 If, on the other hand, the employer contributes to the pension, the
contributions are not subject to employee or employer NI. The effect of this is to
increase the tax-favoured status of private pensions, over and above a tax-free
savings vehicle with no dividend tax credit, from the 10.49 per cent figure shown
in Table 3 to 31.7 per cent.
17 This is regardless of the level of real investment
return. In this case, for an ISA to be as attractive as a pension requires a real rate
of return of more than 25.4 per cent, even assuming a 10 per cent dividend tax
credit for the full 30 years and a 50 per cent dividend pay-out ratio.
The current tax system particularly favours pension contributions by the
employer rather than by the employee. This is typically the case in occupational
pension schemes. But it also creates an incentive for individuals with a personal
                                                                                                                                   
16The rate of employer NI contributions for earnings above the upper earnings limit, which is currently set at
£500 per week, is 12.2 per cent.
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pension (or a stakeholder pension) to receive part of their remuneration in the
form of pension contributions rather than wages. The employee could even
afford to compensate the employer for any additional administration costs that
were incurred.
18 In the case of stakeholder pensions, the employer will be
required to designate a stakeholder scheme and allow employees to make payroll
deductions anyway. Given that the fixed costs of setting up a payroll deduction
facility will already have been incurred, this can only make employer
contributions more likely.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Voluntary saving for retirement can be done either through a designated pension
product, such as the proposed stakeholder pension, or an alternative such as an
Individual Savings Account. An ISA offers more flexibility since the money is
not tied up until retirement — and the fund does not have to be used to purchase
an annuity. However, this note has shown that the tax system creates strong
incentives for people to invest in pensions if dividend tax credits are only paid to
ISA-holders for five years. The tax position of pensions looks even more
favourable if contributions are made by employers, since these are not subject to
employer or employee National Insurance.
TABLE 5
The Impact of Different Tax Treatments on the Return to Saving
Savings vehicle Annual real rate of return
1% 5% 10% 15%
Private pensions
Individual contributions, tax-free lump sum, as now 10.49 10.49 10.49 10.49
Employer contributions, tax-free lump sum, as now 31.72 31.72 31.72 31.72
Individual contributions, tax-free lump sum plus 20%
dividend tax credit, as before July 1997
12.40 21.84 37.22 55.36
Tax-free savings schemes
No dividend tax credit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10% dividend tax credit for 5 years, as now 0.03 0.20 0.57 1.10
10% dividend tax credit for 30 years 0.81 4.72 10.76 17.47
20% dividend tax credit for 30 years, as with PEPs
prior to April 1999
1.72 10.27 24.19 40.60
Note: These percentages express the additional net fund value in alternative savings vehicles compared with
investing in a tax-free savings scheme where no dividend tax credit is paid.
                                                                                                                                   
18The individual would accept a lower gross salary in return for the employer making contributions on their
behalf. Some of the savings from paying lower NI would have to be paid into the employee’s pension fund to
compensate them for the reduction in contracted-out rebate. However, the NI savings are always more than
enough to make up for this shortfall.Fiscal Studies
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The impact of the tax system on the returns to saving in different forms is
illustrated by Table 5, which summarises the additional net fund value from
investing the same amount in different savings vehicles compared with a bench-
mark of a tax-free savings scheme with no dividend tax credits. For comparison,
we also show the returns to saving in pensions prior to July 1997, and to PEPs
prior to April 1999, both of which had dividend tax credits paid at 20 per cent.
Economic efficiency in the taxation of saving requires that, in the absence of
an existing market failure, taxation should not affect people’s decisions about
what form to save in. The government might want to encourage people to save in
a designated retirement savings vehicle. However, there needs to be a good
reason for this to be the case — not least because of the exchequer cost of such
generous treatment. For example, the government’s decision to make means-
tested benefits more generous to pensioners may mean it wants individuals to be
compelled to annuitise their wealth when they retire. However, this does not
explain either the current level of generosity, particularly to individuals who are
unlikely to be reliant on the state in retirement, or the different tax treatment of
employer and employee contributions. The potential problem with taxing
different forms of saving differently is that it results in saving decisions being
driven not by underlying returns or preferences for liquidity, but by the tax
system. Also, the current tax system is most generous to people who can afford
to lock up their savings until retirement, which may be seen as inequitable.
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